

# Making Europeans

How Brexit Can Save the EU





## Table of Contents

Executive Summary: Now We Must Make Europeans

Part 1. Europe's Nation-State Model: Identity + Congruence

- 1.1 Europe's Monolingual Nation-States
  - 1.1.1 State First Congruence: Revolutionary France
  - 1.1.2 Nation First Congruence: Autocratic Germany
- 1.2 Unexceptional Exceptions: Switzerland and Luxembourg
  - 1.2.1 Switzerland: Monolingual Below the Surface
  - 1.2.2 Luxembourg: Congruence With Equal Sets
- 1.3 Without Congruence, Governance Suffers
  - 1.3.1 Belgium: Incomplete Congruence
  - 1.3.2 *De Jure* Multilingualism in the EU

Part 2. Identity Bilingualism: Complementary Identities + Congruence

- 2.1 The Communication and Identity Functions
  - 2.1.1 The Communication Function: Bridge Languages
  - 2.1.2 The Identity Function: Communities of Communication
  - 2.1.3 One Language, Multiple Identities: International Languages
- 2.2 Identity Bilingualism: It Isn't New
- 2.3 Identity Bilingualism and the EU
  - 2.3.1 Affective Legitimacy: Making Europeans
  - 2.3.2 Outcome Legitimacy and the Euro Crisis
  - 2.3.3 Values Legitimacy and the Enforcement Issue
  - 2.3.4 Process Legitimacy and the Democratic Deficit
  - 2.3.5 Ten Reasons To Adopt Identity Bilingualism

Part 3. Implementation: What Will European Identity Bilingualism Look Like?

- 3.1 The Necessary Minimum: Not Hard, Not Expensive
- 3.2 Funding Teacher Education and English Study
- 3.3 Every Possible Outcome is Positive

"We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians."

Massimo Taparelli, marquis d'Azeglio, *I Miei Ricordi* (D'Azeglio Memoirs) (1867)

## Executive Summary: Now We Must Make Europeans

At the birth of Italy, the patriot Massimo Taparelli understood the need for an Italian demos and for the affective legitimacy that we call "patriotism." Today, his words resonate in a broader context: "We have made Europe. Now we must make Europeans."

How can we make Europeans? One answer is obvious, but has yet to be seriously considered - despite the fact that 69% of Europeans want it. French speak French. Germans speak German. Spanish speak Spanish. Europeans have a flag and an anthem, but there is no European language.

This essay explains how a language policy called identity bilingualism can create a European community of communication, while preserving linguistic diversity. Identity bilingualism combines two identity languages, one is determined by each individual and will usually be their birth language. In this essay's proposal, *but not essentially*, the second choice is English. Before Brexit, choosing English would have destabilized the European balance of power and interests. With the vote for Brexit, using English will no longer privilege a large member of the EU and therefore, is available for use in the creation of a European community of communication.

This essay is divided into three parts. Part 1 looks at the history of European governance, in particular at the rise of the European nation-state. It shows that a language based identity and the congruence of a community of communication with the institutions of governance is the fundamental characteristic of the European model of governance.

Part 2 introduces the dichotomy between the communication function of a language and its identity function. A second section shows how the nation-state model (linguistic identity + congruence) can be substantially replicated in multinational governance with a policy of identity bilingualism (complementary linguistic identities + congruence). The final section shows how the four types of legitimacy can be better achieved in EU governance, ending with a section entitled: "Ten Reasons to Adopt Identity Bilingualism".

Creating a European community of communication and establishing its congruence with the institutions of EU governance will have at least these ten positive consequences:<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> As a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I have an 11th reason. My country will be more negatively impacted by Brexit than any other EU member. If English is used in a policy of identity bilingualism, the negative effects of Brexit on Ireland will be partially, if only temporarily, offset.

Democracy is inextricably bound with language and one wonders how it can be managed without a community of communication. Achieving meaningful, plurilingual democracy is a challenge that has not yet been taken up. It is perhaps the greatest obstacle to overcoming the EU's democratic deficit.

Susan Wright, *Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration* (2000)

1. Identity bilingualism is what Europeans want. Over two-thirds of the EU's citizens (69%) want Europeans to have a common language. (Eurobarometer 386)

2. Identity bilingualism will increase democratic legitimacy. Nationalists use the relative disparity in democratic legitimacy to attack the EU for its "democratic deficit." Identity bilingualism makes it possible to close the gap.

3. Identity bilingualism will increase trade among member states. Trade between members of the EU is 20% of GDP. In the United States of America (USA), most of the domestic GDP is traded between states. Much of the difference is due to the linguistic unity of the USA.

4. Identity bilingualism will promote growth in the services sector of the EU economy. Services are 70% of the EU economy. Cross border trade in services is primarily hampered by linguistic barriers. More importantly, global trade in services is increasingly important and is primarily conducted in English. The EU can claim a bigger share.

5. Identity bilingualism will increase employment of European youth. Unemployment among the young is nearly double the overall rate in several of the member states. Identity bilingualism will provide job opportunities across Europe and globally that are especially suitable and attractive to younger workers.

6. Identity bilingualism will increase solidarity. Can Europeans stand together against external threats or will they be played off against one another. Identity bilingualism will increase European solidarity and the EU's affective legitimacy.

7. Identity bilingualism will lessen dependence on the United States of America. The USA is becoming a less reliable ally for Europe. Identity bilingualism will allow the EU to be more self reliant.

8. Identity bilingualism will make global problems more tractable. The EU is an effort by 28 countries to act in concert. Regional governance, instead of 200 nation-states, will make it easier to respond to global problems.

9. Identity bilingualism will preserve diversity and increase access to diversity. A policy of bilingualism will shelter even the smallest European language communities, while providing the benefits of membership in a pan-European language community.

10. Identity bilingualism will help make Europe a global leader. To be a global leader, the EU must be successful. Identity bilingualism will permit more robust responses to challenges. A successful EU will be the new global model of regional governance.

“I do know that there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-government if possible, well governed, if they are fortunate, but in any event governed.”

Walter Lippmann New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 10, 1963

Part 3 of the essay looks at the implementation of identity bilingualism, beginning with its very modest initial requirements. It concludes with the observation that adoption of a policy of identity bilingualism is a “no lose” proposition for the EU because, at every level of funding, the expenses are subject to the normal budget process and the benefits will exceed the costs.

“The strong European states that emerged in the nineteenth century were built around a national principle that made language and ethnicity the core of national identity.”

Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

## Part 1

### Europe’s Nation-State Model: Identity + Congruence

This part examines the rise of the European nation-states and how they achieved legitimacy by aligning their institutions of governance with monolingual communities of communication: “one nation, one state, one language.” This congruence was essential to the rise of democratic citizenship.

#### 1.1 Europe’s Monolingual Nation-States

Post-Feudal Monarchies. Post-feudal states emerged after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The Peace of Westphalia established Westphalian Sovereignty, the equality of states under international law and a governmental monopoly on force within each state. The subsequent rise of vernacular state languages originated in the conflict between post-feudal (absolute) monarchs and both the nobles, who wanted to preserve feudal privileges, and the Church, which also had extensive privileges.

To consolidate power, monarchs increased their control of governance by replacing the nobility and clerics. Commoners were more loyal, because they lacked independent resources, and more competent, because their positions were not hereditary. Switching governance to a privileged dialect of a vernacular language increased the pool of potential officials and reduced the power of the clergy, which resulted from Latin’s monopoly of literacy.

Two Types of Nation-State. The European nation-state is an imagined or constructed ethnolinguistic community (nation) that is congruent with the institutions of governance (state) and circumscribed by a boundary (state). In its ideal form, the European nation-state is one-nation, one-state, one-language.

There were two ways to achieve congruence: (1) state first: which began with an existing state and imposed linguistic uniformity within its borders and (2) nation first: which drew the state’s boundary around all or part of an ethnolinguistic nation, real or imagined, and then added the institutions of governance. In the second case, the population within the circumscribed territory was either monolingual or part of a continuum. If oral diversity persisted, as in Germany, there was uniformity in the written language. In the few cases where multiple languages persisted, governance was a function of monolingual sub-units. In both the state first and nation first model, monolingualism was used to align the communities of communication with the institutions of governance. This congruence is the key to the success of the European nation-state model.

1.1.1 State First Congruence: Revolutionary France. The first nation-states started with an existing monarchical boundary (state). Boundaries reflected a monarch's ability to project military power and hold territory acquired by inheritance, conquest or marriage. If natural barriers were significant, the state's boundary usually conformed. Using natural boundaries often disregards the distribution of ethnolinguistic communities. Thus, because the Catalan and Basque (Euskaldunak) language communities span the Pyrenees, each is now divided between France and Spain.

In monarchies, language was only of concern to the elite. For example, the Académie Française began as a group of distinguished French citizens who were interested in establishing standards for literary French. In 1634, it was coopted by Cardinal Richelieu, First Minister of King Louis XIII, and tasked with creating a dictionary and a grammar of standard French. Cardinal Richelieu's objective was to further consolidate the King's power by establishing a bureaucratic administration that used a standardized vernacular.

“The French Revolution had, moreover, unleashed not just demands for popular political participation but also a new form of identity by which a shared language and culture would be the central source of unity for the new democratic public.”

Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (2014)

Revolutionary France. The French Revolution in 1789 changed France dramatically. The adoption of a policy of territorial monolingualism was among the most radical of the changes. Monolingualism was deemed essential to consolidating and sustaining the revolution, because the revolutionary government needed to communicate its political message to each citizen. For the first time, the language that the people spoke mattered.

On June 6, 1794, a key document was submitted to the revolutionary government by the Abbé Grégoire. Its descriptive title was: “On the Need and Means for Eliminating Dialects and Universalizing the Use of the French language.” The French Revolution inaugurated the transition to “one nation, one state, one language,” but did not complete the task.

Napoleonic France. The territorial monolingualism that the revolution established in principle, but lacked the time and resources to fully implement, was subsequently advanced by Napoleon's military adventures. The Napoleonic Wars proved that a monolingual army performed better in combat. Speaking a single language avoided misunderstandings. Patriotism, based on a French identity, also improved martial performance. While many army units were initially composed of soldiers from a single area and some units used a regional patois or a non-standard dialect, replacements were assigned randomly. As campaigns



consumed soldiers, units became increasingly diverse and reliant on standard French. Soldiers returning to diverse communities made French the language of patriotism.

From the 1880's, France mandated a primary school education in standard French. The effects of revolution, war, universal education, the need for literate workers due to industrialization and the growth of commercial printing all combined to complete the transition from the *laissez faire* multilingualism of feudalism to the territorial monolingualism of the French nation-state.

1.1.2 Nation First Congruence: Autocratic Germany. The second path to becoming a European nation-state, the “nation first” model, drew a state boundary around a real or imagined “nation,” which was identified by a common language or the mutual comprehensibility of dialects. Language is key, because it is the means for a culture’s expression and the essential tool for its maintenance and transmission. The nation first model was used to create Germany.

In the century after the Reformation of 1517, Lutheranism became the official religion in many of the northern pieces of the HRE. Roman Catholicism dominated in the South. A combination of religious intolerance and political opportunism led to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and resulted in the death of one-third of the HRE’s German speaking population. The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, ended the Thirty Years War.

The Peace of Westphalia was not as peaceful as hoped. Among its effects was the loosening of Austrian control of the HRE. This allowed Brandenburg-Prussia to emerge as a rival. The years between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution saw Prussia assert itself in military competition with Austria. Notably, this included the War of the Austrian Succession (1740 - 1748) and the Seven Years War (1756 – 1763).

France, fighting first to defend its revolution and, later, for the glory of Napoleon’s empire, laid waste the Peace of Westphalia. The HRE was a primary target of Napoleonic aggression. In 1805, at the Battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon’s forces (including some allied German states) defeated the HRE. The following year, Emperor Francis II abdicated. With the HRE gone, Napoleon created the Confederacy of the Rhine. He reduced the number of states from over 300 to 39.

The Confederacy of the Rhine lasted only nine years, until Napoleon’s defeat and the Congress of Vienna (1814-15). The Vienna treaties established a German Confederation which was composed of 35 states. The intent was a divided and ineffective collection of independent parts that would prevent either Austria or Prussia from unifying the German speaking people.

Could the speakers of different German dialects, divided into dozens of units of governance, become a unified polity? A strong affirmative was expressed by the German philosopher Johann Fichte (1762-1814). His belief in the imperative of a German speaking nation-state was clearly expressed in his influential 1808 book, *Address to the German Nation*:

“Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand

each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.”

If there was to be a unified Germany, it would require a resolution of the rivalry between Prussia and Austria. In the decade after becoming Minister President and Foreign Minister of Prussia in 1862, Otto von Bismarck engineered three wars that united 25 of the German speaking states. The first war, in 1864, was against Denmark to resolve the issue of control of Schleswig-Holstein. Its larger objective was to unite northern Germans behind Prussian leadership. The second war, in 1866, was with Austria. It established Prussia as the leader of the German speaking people. In 1867, the German Confederation was replaced by the Northern German Confederation, under Prussian leadership.

The third and final war of German consolidation, in 1871, was with France - in order to add the southern German states, which France wanted kept as a buffer. During the shelling of Paris, with victory imminent, King Wilhelm I of Prussia was crowned as the Emperor of Germany. The unification of Germany, on the Lesser Germany model, established a monolingual nation-state using the nation first model.

## 1.2 Unexceptional Exceptions: Switzerland and Luxembourg

Not all of Europe’s nation-states adhere to the ideal of one nation, one state, one language; but in all cases there is congruence between communities of communication and the institutions of governance. Europe’s unexceptional exceptions are Switzerland and Luxembourg. In this section, we will look at these two cases of successful congruence. The following section will look at the effects of incomplete congruence in Belgium and *de jure* multilingualism in the EU.

“Switzerland may be quadrilingual, but to all intents and purposes each point of its territory can be viewed as unilingual.

Francois Grin, *Language Policy in Multilingual Switzerland in Multilingualism and Government* (2000) K. Deprez and T. Du Pleisse Ed.

1.2.1 Switzerland: Monolingual Below the Surface. Switzerland is the country most often cited as an exceptions to Europe’s monolingual nation-state model. However, Swiss citizens overwhelmingly live in monolingual communities. Language rights are territorial, not personal. Everywhere in Switzerland, citizens must use an official language when dealing with the government. Switzerland is linguistically segregated and adheres to territorial monolingualism below a surface of apparent multilingualism. Of Switzerland’s 26 cantons, 22 have one official language (17 German, 4 French and 1 Italian) and most functions of government are performed by cantons or their constituent districts and municipalities.

Of the four cantons that are not monolingual, three are bilingual in German and French: Bern (Berne), Fribourg (Freiburg), Valais (Wallis). The fourth, Graubundën, is trilingual. In the three bilingual

cantons, congruence is achieved with monolingual districts and municipalities. In Valais (Wallis) there are 6 French speaking districts (Lower Valais) and 8 German speaking districts (Upper Valais). In Freiburg (Freiburg), the French districts are in the West and the German districts are in the East. Similar internal linguistic territoriality exist in Bern (Berne)<sup>2</sup> and even in trilingual Graubünden.<sup>3</sup>

1.2.2 Luxembourg: Congruence With Equal Sets. Luxembourg is a unique case of congruence in which three languages define a single community of communication. In mathematical terms, Luxembourg's language communities are equal sets.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Luxembourg is not as different from territorial monolingualism as it first appears. There is still the crucial congruence between a language community and the institutions of governance. Luxembourg is, however, instructive in that it demonstrates that a nation-state can combine congruence with a language policy of bilingualism<sup>5</sup> or, as is the case in Luxembourg, even trilingualism. Here is some relevant information:

(1) Luxembourg's citizens are trilingual in the same three languages: Luxembourgish 90% (77% native, 13% second language), German 92% (4% native and 88% second language) and French 96% (6% native, 90% second language). Thus, Luxembourg is a linguistically unified community of communication.

(2) Luxembourgish is used primarily as an oral language. A written form only became official in 1975.

(3) French is a prestige language, but is so widely spoken that it primarily occupies functional domains. For example, French is the language of the legal system, reflecting the adoption of the Napoleonic Code.

(4) Newspapers are predominantly in German, but with French interspersed. French is common in advertisements for luxury goods, in announcements and in articles with a European or cultural focus. The broadcast media predominantly uses Luxembourgish, but news is often presented in German or in a mix with Luxembourgish. It is assumed that readers, listeners and viewers understand all three languages.

(5) Government predominantly writes in French and German. However, Luxembourgish is accommodated. Luxembourgish predominates in informal situations.

The key to maintaining linguistic unity is Luxembourg's school system. Teachers must be proficient in all three languages. Students are taught all three languages and classes are taught in all three languages. Preschool and early elementary education is usually in Luxembourgish. In late primary school and continuing until the 9th grade, students transition to German. Math and Science are often taught in French. In grades 10

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<sup>2</sup> 85% speak German and just over 10% speak French. Jura Bernois is the French speaking territory, where 90% of the population are Francophones.

<sup>3</sup> Graubünden, Switzerland's largest canton, is officially trilingual. But, its municipalities have official languages.

<sup>4</sup> Equal sets are sets that contain the same elements, but not necessarily in the same order.

<sup>5</sup> A similar case is found in bilingual Paraguay. Ninety percent of the population speaks Guarani and eighty-seven percent speaks Spanish. Unlike affluent Luxembourg, Paraguay ranks in the lower half of the world's countries on the basis of per capita GDP. Bilingualism is not just for the affluent.

through 13, humanities instruction shifts to French. Students tracked to vocational education generally continue in German. Assistance and explanation is always available in Luxembourgish, as needed.

The important point is that, in Luxembourg, identity trilingualism achieves congruence. If identity trilingualism can work in Luxembourg, then the EU will be able to implement the far less demanding policy of identity bilingualism.

“Belgium - a hodge podge of three regions (Flanders, French speaking Wallonia and Brussels), three linguistic communities (Flemish, French and German) and a weak federal government - is dysfunctional. That dysfunction finds its most painful expression in the capital, where Flemish geography and French culture do not align.”

Roger Cohen (Op-Ed) *Wall Street Journal* April 11, 2016

### 1.3 Without Congruence, Governance Suffers

1.3.1 Belgium: Incomplete Congruence. As we just saw, Switzerland and Luxembourg are not exceptions to the European model of congruence between a demos and a polity. Usefully, Europe also provides an example of incomplete congruence. In Belgium, incomplete congruence shows that a lack of congruence, in even a small part of a nation-state, can disrupt governance.

Belgium is largely governed using territorial monolingualism: Dutch<sup>6</sup> is the language of governance in the North (Flanders), French is used in the South (Wallonia). There is a very small area in the East that uses German.<sup>7</sup> In this regard, Belgium is territorially monolingual in much the same way as Switzerland. However, there are exceptions: (1) the officially bilingual Brussels Capital Region (BCR) and (2) twenty-one municipalities, along borders between language communities, which provide facilities for citizens who speak the second most common language. Of these, six are adjacent to the BCR. These six and the BCR are ground zero in Belgium’s dysfunctional politics.

The BCR is an enclave in Dutch speaking Flanders, close to the border with Francophone Wallonia. In the BCR,<sup>8</sup> citizens can choose to deal with government in either French or Dutch. Most choose French, but the government operates in two languages. The BCR had a Dutch speaking majority until the middle of the 20th Century, but is now heavily Francophone. Friction between French speakers and Dutch speakers is reduced by the official bilingualism of the BCR, but not in the six municipalities adjacent to the BCR where Francophones may have become the majority but the municipal governments still operate in Dutch, with

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<sup>6</sup> I refer to the Flemish dialect as Dutch, but its speakers are Flemish and the region is Flanders.

<sup>7</sup> German speakers are 1% of Belgium’s population and are not discussed in this essay. They were attached to Belgium at the end of World War I.

<sup>8</sup> It was not called the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) until 1988. I use BCR throughout for simplicity.

facilities for Francophones in some cases. The linguistic aspirations of Francophones and the corresponding defensiveness of Dutch speakers provide fuel for political fires that may start in the contentious BCR suburbs but quickly engulf national politics.

Some history is helpful to understanding why the politics of language use is always center stage, periodically threatening to cause Belgium to come apart at its linguistic seams. I can't do it justice in a short space, but this is an introduction.

1) A census in 1846 asked about language use. The breakdown was 40% French speaking and 60% Dutch speaking. French was the elite language and the sole language of government, even though Dutch speakers were the majority. It wasn't until seven decades after independence that Dutch was added as Belgium's second official language.

2) In 1921, Belgium chose territorial language rights over personal language rights. Francophones were concerned that choosing the personality principle would require bilingualism for government jobs. This would favor the Flemish, who were far more likely to know French than were the Walloons to know Dutch. Broadly, then, Belgium chose the Swiss territorial monolingualism model.

3) In 1932, Parliament passed a law requiring language use in municipalities to be determined by the citizens' preference, as established in the decennial census. In cases where a minority language community reached a 30% threshold, the majority language government would add "facilities" to assist speakers of the smaller language. It was not clear whether facilities were intended as a transitional accommodation, until the minority learned the majority language, or a permanent accommodation that would allow a linguistic minority to sustain itself and, perhaps, eventually become the majority.

4) The next scheduled census was not conducted, due to the German invasion in 1940. The results of the next completed census, in 1947, were suppressed because of the political problems that applying them would have created. When the census figures were finally released, in 1954, they were not used. Instead, an *ad hoc* compromise moved three municipalities from Flanders into the bilingual BCR. French language facilities were added in four other municipalities in the BCR suburbs.

5) In 1960, because of a demographic shift in favor of Francophones in the BCR and its suburbs, many Flemish boycotted the language questions on the census and joined street demonstrations demanding permanent language borders and a limit of 19 bilingual municipalities in the BCR. They were successful. The census data was again disregarded. As demanded by the Flemish, the BCR was limited to 19 municipalities. In another *ad hoc* compromise, facilities for Francophones were added to two more municipalities in the BCR suburbs. Moving language boundaries, based on census data, was highly polarizing and impossible to implement.

6) In 1964, the earlier success of the Flemish boycott and protests led to the formation of the Democratic Front of Francophones. It opposed both fixed language borders and the limiting of the BCR to 19 municipalities.

7) Support for language based regional parties, in the 1960's, caused the national political parties to split into linguistically segregated pairs. In 1968, the Christian Democrats split into a Dutch speaking party and a French speaking counterpart. In 1972, the Liberals divided into two language specific parties. In 1978 the Socialist Party split into a French Socialist Party and a Dutch Socialist Party.

With this background, we can appreciate the disputes that immobilized Belgium's national government for half a decade, from 2007 through 2012. Although temporarily muted by the formation of a coalition government, linguistic division could easily result in another impasse after the next election. That will happen in 2019, if not sooner.<sup>9</sup>

"Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist."

John Stuart Mill *On Liberty and Other Essays* (1861)

Belgium's Existential Crisis: 2007 - 2012. After the 2003 elections, Belgium's Constitutional Court declared an election district that combined the BCR with parts of Flemish Brabant (BHV) unconstitutional. The decision was based on unequal voting rights. Francophones in Hall and Vilvoorde (Flemish territory) were permitted to vote in French language community elections. Dutch speakers in adjacent Walloon territory did not have an equivalent right to vote in the Dutch language community elections.<sup>10</sup> The Constitutional Court allowed the 2003 election results to stand - to let the political process fix the problem. This turned out to be wildly optimistic. Following the 2007 general election, Belgium was unable to form a federal government for 196 days. The matter of BHV was the biggest obstacle, but fiscal policy disputes reinforced the linguistic division.<sup>11</sup>

A poll on August 24, 2007 found that 45.8% of the Flemish wanted Flanders to declare independence. On September 1, 2007, the Dutch language newspaper De Standard, devoted an entire issue to the question of how Flanders would fare as a separate country. By November, things were so bad that the Flemish legislators in the subject matter committee threatened to unilaterally resolve the BHV impasse. This

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<sup>9</sup> As I write in February of 2017, the largely Francophone BCR is threatening very strict enforcement of a contentious noise policy with very large fines. Doing this will cause serious operational problems for the Zaventem airport in Flanders, forcing the movement of air traffic to Liege airport in Francophone Wallonia, where fines are not imposed. As many as 60,000 jobs might move from Dutch Flanders to Francophone Wallonia.

<sup>10</sup> Belgium has both territorial governments and language governments. They are a very complicated result of linguistic politics that is not covered in this essay. Explaining them is not, thankfully, necessary.

<sup>11</sup> The more fiscally conservative Flemish wanted spending cuts to welfare programs that were more heavily used and supported by the less affluent and predominantly socialist Walloons.

resulted in a walkout by the Walloon members and the invocation of a rule that deferred the matter. This allowed the formation of a caretaker federal government.

In 2010, the government dissolved over the still unresolved BHV problem and new elections were held. New Flemish Alliance (NVA), a separatist party, won handily in Flanders. The anti-separatist French Socialist Party won in Wallonia. The regional success of diametrically opposed platforms made a coalition government impossible. No combination of parties emerged and Belgium had no functioning federal government for 485 days.

As public frustration turned to anger, agreement was finally reached by the passage of a constitutional amendment which provided for devolution of some governance from the federal level to the territorial and language governments. Flemish nationalists accepted devolution as a step towards future independence. The compromise included a resolution of the BHV problem.<sup>12</sup>

While the immediate crisis was resolved, if only after the longest deadlock in the formation of a government in world history, Belgium's split personality remains. As French speakers in the suburbs of the BCR continue to increase in both absolute and relative terms, the official status of Dutch is increasingly perceived by Francophones as oppressive.

Political differences were muted in 2014, when the Flemish nationalists of the NVA formed a coalition government, but the hiatus is nearing its scheduled end in 2019. The 2019 elections are likely to be as contentious and divisive as any in Belgium's history and post election government formation will be correspondingly difficult.

“There is no doubt about it, our internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably linked.”

José Manuel Durão Barroso, EU President  
State of the Union Message, September 11, 2013

1.3.2 De Jure Multilingualism in the EU. In light of the coercion required to establish territorial monolingualism in the nation-states, it is not surprising that language rationalization was not a priority for the founders of the EU. *De jure*, the EU asserts that all 24 of its official languages are equal. *De facto*, English is the first among equals. French is second and German third, although second and third place may be on the cusp of reversal. Everyone understands that, in the real world, equality for 24 official languages is a chimera.

Superficially, it can be asserted that the EU follows the Swiss model of “monolingualism below the surface”. However, the Swiss analogy quickly breaks down:

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<sup>12</sup> Halle and Vilvoorde were separated from BHV and combined with Dutch speaking Leuven.

(1) Scale matters. The population of the EU is 61 times that of Switzerland. The geographic area of the EU is 100 times that of Switzerland.

(2) Economics matters. Switzerland has a *per capita* GDP that is greater than all of the EU member states, except tiny Luxembourg. It's easier to govern a wealthy community. The per capita GDP in the EU is equivalent to \$33,300.00 and ranges from \$100,000.00 in Luxembourg to \$6,800.00 in Bulgaria. Convergence is a goal in the EU, but it has been an expensive proposition and is happening unevenly. This is shown most clearly and painfully by the lack of convergence between Euro Zone members Germany and Greece.

(3) History matters. Switzerland has a long and cherished history of fighting together for their freedom against aggressive neighbors. Europe has a long history of neighbor fighting neighbor. This has developed patriotism among the Swiss and suspicion among Europeans.

(4) Degree of rationalization matters. The EU has 6 times as many official languages as the EU. The EU could match Switzerland, which has three languages excluding the tiny fraction of Romansch speakers who are all bilingual in one of the three, by privileging German and French along with English. However, Germany and France are, by a wide margin, the two dominant economies in Europe. The practice of Germany and France meeting to make decisions that the other members ratify is already contentious. German hegemony, in the form of tight monetary policy, is now seen as an issue by some. Privileging German and French, however logical, is politically impossible.

English is increasing its role as Europe's *lingua franca*. Between 2005 and 2012, there was a 13 point drop in the percentage who felt that it was important for their children to learn French. German suffered a smaller drop, 8 percentage points. (Eurobarometer 386). The increasing role of English *might*, over a *very long* period of time, result in a *de facto* policy of identity bilingualism. However, it would be too late to help with current and near future problems in EU legitimacy. A *de jure* policy of identity bilingualism, as explained in the next Part, will greatly accelerate the process and time is of the essence.

Europeans have spoken on the topic of language policy. In 2012, the European Commission released Special Eurobarometer 386, entitled "Europeans and Their Languages." Among its findings were the following:

1. The majority of Europeans (81%) think that all languages spoken within the EU should be treated equally. Governments, in other words, should not privilege any major ethnolinguistic community or monolingual nation-state.

2. Around seven in ten (69%) also think that Europeans should be able to speak a common language. This is an endorsement of the idea of a European community of communication.



Any conflict in these desires is resolved by identity bilingualism. With an identity language that is not a large nation-state's official language<sup>13</sup>, the EU will be able to meet its citizen's neutrality preference and still create the desired community of communication.

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<sup>13</sup> One alternative to English, for example, would be Luxembourgish. Designed languages, *including the possibility of an EU design*, offer other alternatives. However, English has a huge head start and the advantage of being the global *lingua franca*. Europeans are much more likely to want to learn international English than any alternative.

“Europe has arrived at a crossroads. Either Europe develops into a political union and becomes a truly global player, or it moves backward as a continent of nation-states that have neither political nor economic clout on a global level.”

Chancellor Gerhard Schroder 10/10/2011

## Part 2

### Identity Bilingualism: Complementary Identities + Congruence

#### 2.1 The Communication and Identity Functions

In this section, the communication and identity functions of language are disaggregated. Afterwards, identity bilingualism is explained and its ability to improve EU governance is discussed.

2.1.1 The Communication Function: Bridge Languages. In order for different language communities to communicate, language “bridges” are necessary. The use of a bridge language does not invoke a common identity. This contrasts with *intra* community language use, which unites a language’s communication function with an identity function.

Pidgins and *Lingua Franca*. Bridge languages come in two flavors: pidgins and *lingua franca*. A pidgin is a hybrid of two or more languages that is negotiated by the speakers of different languages. A *lingua franca*, on the other hand, is any established language that is available for use as a bridge language. Today, as *lingua franca* are almost always available, pidgins are rare.<sup>14</sup>

*Lingua franca*. The proper name “Lingua Franca” means “Language of the Franks” and refers to a pidgin that was used in Mediterranean trade for many centuries. The generic term “lingua franca,” (lower case) came into use much later and refers to any established language that is used as a bridge. It can be the first language of some, or a second language for all.

Although only a few languages are widely used as *lingua franca*, learning any foreign language makes it available as a *lingua franca* bridge for use with its native speakers. People generally choose to learn a foreign language (*lingua franca*) that is the native language of a large, proximate or prestigious community. The larger and more powerful a language community, the greater is the utility of its language as a *lingua franca*. In a world with six thousand languages, knowing a major *lingua franca* is often very useful, especially for people from the smaller language communities.

English as a *Lingua Franca*. English is now the most widely used *lingua franca*. That the language of an average sized country situated off of the West Coast of Europe became a global *lingua franca* is not due to any characteristics that make English particularly suited to the role. It is, rather, because the English

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<sup>14</sup> Some Creole languages that began as pidgins have retained the name “Pidgin”, but Creoles are normal languages with native speakers .

established settlement colonies that displaced indigenous populations in the vast spaces of North America and Australia and repopulated them with Anglophones.

When Europe was decimated by two wars in the first half of the 20th Century, economic and military leadership shifted to England's former colonies, which had escaped destruction because of their geography. At the end of the Second World War, the United States of America (USA) alone produced about half of the world's greatly diminished GDP.

Even with the inevitable decline in the percentage of the world's GDP produced by Anglophone nations, as the world recovered, there was an increase in the use of English as a *lingua franca*. The development of the internet and other improvements in communication and transportation technology increased the utility of *lingua franca* English.

There are four structural reasons that the current strength of *lingua franca* English is likely to persist and increase:

Network Externalities. If having more users increases the utility of a network, people will use a network with more users rather than a smaller network. People join Facebook because there are already millions of users. Positive network externalities create a "bandwagon" effect. English, like Facebook, has very positive network externalities.

Path Dependence. Once a practice is established, it is easier to conform than to change the standard. A classic example is the QWERTY layout of English language keyboards. The arrangement of keys looks random, but was designed to make it harder to type fast. At a time when manual typewriters were prone to physical jamming, speed was not an unmitigated virtue. Now, even though manual typewriters are obsolete and physical jamming is not a problem, the QWERTY keyboard is still the standard. After millions of keyboard users internalized the QWERTY arrangement, the cost of retraining was not justified by a small gain in typing speed. English is the QWERTY of *lingua franca*.

Probability Sensitivity. People will not learn a language unless there is a reasonable probability that its subsequent use will justify the effort. Without such a probability, there is insufficient motivation to learn any language. Globally, people expect to be able to use English more frequently and more widely (intensive and extensive) than any other foreign language. So, probability sensitivity encourages learning English as a foreign language and using it as a *lingua franca*.

Maximin Communication. The maximization of the minimum (maximin), explains language use in groups with a mixed repertoire. Members of a linguistically heterogeneous group want to maximize the base level of understanding. The simplest example is when two people can speak each other's language. Either language could be used, but communication is maximized by using the first language of the person whose second language skill is inferior. In Europe, the desire for maximin communication often results in the use of English in linguistically diverse groups, even if no one in the conversation is a native English speaker.

2.1.2 The Identity Function: Communities of Communication. There are two primary ways that an identity attaches: (1) a linguistically heterogeneous group converges on a single language, becoming a unified

language community or (2) a single language community differentiates their language use and diverges into separate communities with different identities.

Identity by Convergence: Hebrew in Palestine. When a linguistically heterogeneous group wants to become a community of communication, they can converge on a single language. An interesting example of this phenomena is the modern history of Hebrew.

The revival of Hebrew in publishing began as a project of the literary elite in the Jewish diaspora. The subsequent addition of an identity function occurred in Palestine. The revival of Hebrew in Palestine is usually divided into three periods: the First (Farmers) Aliyah<sup>15</sup>, the Second Aliyah and the British Mandate. In some of the agricultural settlements of the First Aliyah, schools taught Hebrew and used it as a language of instruction. Problematically, both Ashkenazi and Sephardic dialects were used without standardization. To address this problem, in 1890 the Hebrew Language Committee standardized spoken Hebrew.

In the Second Aliyah, there was a strong desire to express commitment to Israel by separating one's identity from life in the diaspora. This encouraged the use of the recently standardized Hebrew. Hebrew moved into the public space, especially meetings that drew from multiple language communities. In 1909, Tel Aviv was established as a consciously Hebrew speaking city. In 1913, when the Company for the Aid of German Jews wanted to use German as the language of instruction at a science and engineering school that they established in Tel Aviv, a backlash forced the use of Hebrew.

The third period of Hebrew's revival is marked by the end of the Ottoman Empire, at the end of the First World War. In the Tel Aviv of the British Protectorate, the Legion of the Defenders of the Language used social pressure to encourage immigrants to learn and use Hebrew. Speaking any other language in public could result in a remonstrance - "Ivri, daber ivrit" (Hebrews speak Hebrew). Thus, even before Israel was established in 1948, the groundwork was laid for convergence on Hebrew as its identity language.

Identity by Divergence: Congruence Fails in Yugoslavia. There are many examples of identity by divergence. Divergence is how the world ended up with six thousand different languages. Divergence is occurring now, in the Balkans, in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Historically, language use in the Balkans was a Slavic continuum. Change began with standardization, led by the literate elite, in the middle of the 19th Century. Writers and academics codified a language, starting with the dialect spoken in Zagreb. The standard was published in the Vienna Literary Agreement of 1850. Though several names were used (Serbian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian and Croato-Serbian) the Vienna Literary Agreement unified a written language.

After World War I, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes chose the standard of the Vienna Literary Agreement as its official written language. It was called "Serbo-Croato-Slovene." For the average and often illiterate person, an undifferentiated language continuum was still their linguistic environment.

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<sup>15</sup> Aliyah (ascent) refers to a return to Israel from the diaspora. The first wave, or First Aliyah, was primarily composed of farmers.

In 1941, Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany. The anti-Nazi resistance did not use the elite standard, as partisans were principally from low literacy agricultural communities. After the Second World War, the newly established Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized multiple languages.

In 1954, Yugoslavia's writers and academics renewed the call for standardization. In a declaration called the Novi Sad Agreement, they insisted on a single language called Serbo-Croatian with two dialects, Western (Zageb) and Eastern (Belgrade). They accepted the use of either the Latin or Cyrillic script. An official Serbo-Croatian was subsequently adopted by the government.

Divergence Prevails: Yugoslavia Shatters. In March of 1967, 130 influential Croatian writers and academics, expressing an emergent ethnolinguistic nationalism, published the Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language.<sup>16</sup> Unlike the authors of the Vienna Literary Agreement and the Novi Sad Agreement, they advocated distinct languages. Many were Croatian nationalist who wanted a Croatian identity language.

Tito employed the necessary force to suppress the nationalism. However, to defuse the threat of regional disruption, a new constitution in 1974 decentralized Yugoslavia's government. Substantial sovereignty was transferred to regional governments, with the federal government retaining only powers specified in the constitution. This created the possibility of congruence between regional language communities and regional institutions of governance.

The 1974 devolution facilitated the dissolution of Yugoslavia after the 1991 breakup of Warsaw Pact. Skipping the bloody details, the present situation is four official languages: Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian and Montenegrin. Since the written forms of the four languages are based on the Serbo-Croatian of the Vienna Literary Agreement, they could be seen as variants of a poly centric language. That is not, however, how most users perceive them. They are identity languages for distinct communities. They have separate language academies and variations continually accrete.

“... because of differences of language, all the similarity of their common human nature is of no avail to unite them in fellowship. So true is this that a man would be more cheerful with his dog for company than with a foreigner.”

St. Augustine (354-430) *The City of God*

2.1.3 One Language, Multiple Identities: International Languages. Languages come in many sizes. Some are small and local. A few very large languages are global. The four most internationally dispersed languages are those that spread during the period of European exploration and conquest: Spanish, Portuguese, French and English.

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<sup>16</sup> Its publication date is celebrated annually with a week dedicated to the celebration of Croatian culture.

These international languages are now associated with multiple identities. In fact, it is probably more accurate to refer to each of these four in the plural. Despite the best efforts of the Real Academia Española, there is not just one Spanish, there are Spanishes. Despite the best efforts of the Académie Française, there is not just one French, there are Frenches. Portuguese has two language academies, one in Portugal and one in Brazil. There is not one Portuguese, there are Portugueses. Most differentiated of all the international languages is English, perhaps in part because English has no language academy.

Citizens in the United States of America and Canada share a border and language, but not an identity. If you want to upset a Canadian, just suggest that they are indistinguishable from their southern neighbors. So, while a language can encode an identity, one language can also encode multiple distinct identities. *This capacity is crucial to the role of international languages in a policy of identity bilingualism.*

“Men and women do not choose collective identification as they chose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a time.”

Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (1990)

## 2.2 Identity Bilingualism: It Isn't New

Identity bilingualism refers to a situation where complementary identities are expressed in different languages and there is congruence between communities of communication (demos) and the institutions of governance (polity). The term “identity bilingualism” is a neologism, but the underlying reality is not new. When a foreign language is learned, a *lingua franca* bridge has been built; but the learner is not a member of two communities. In identity bilingualism, the bilingual individual is a member of two communities.

Identity Bilingualism As Government Policy. A few governments have adopted language policies that meet the definition of identity bilingualism, although they do not use that term. I'll briefly discuss Indonesia and Tanzania.

Indonesia. Indonesia's national motto is: “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.” The phrase comes from a 14th Century poem celebrating tolerance between Buddhists and Muslims. It means: “different, but the same kind.” With thousands of islands, hundreds of languages and a multitude of ethnic, racial and religious communities, Indonesia is exceptionally diverse in both geography and population. To overcome the demographic and geographic obstacles to unity, newly independent Indonesia used the most powerful tool for identity building: it designated a common language. It did not, however, make any attempt to reduce linguistic diversity. It did not want territorial monolingualism. It just wanted national congruence.

Riau Malay, a trade language, was chosen as the Bahasa Indonesia. Bahasa means language. Riau Malay was the first language of 10% of Indonesia's population. Javanese, in contrast, was dominant - spoken by the Jakarta elite and almost half of the population. The decision to use the smaller trade language, rather

than privilege Javanese, was inspired.<sup>17</sup> Bahasa Indonesia did not reinforce the power of Jakarta and the Javanese. Its adoption was not seen as fostering hegemony, so there was no backlash.

When it came to implementing the decision to adopt Bahasa Indonesia, the government faced additional obstacles: (1) low literacy levels, (2) poor schools in many areas, (3) poor infrastructure for transportation and communication, and (4) little common history except for Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation. Indonesia overcame all of these obstacles. The superordinate goal of learning Bahasa Indonesia created solidarity and demonstrated the value of working towards a common goal.

Designating Riau Malay as the Bahasa Indonesian was a government policy of identity bilingualism. One identity is encoded in Bahasa Indonesia and the other is encoded in each individual's birth language. Today, Bahasa Indonesia allows Indonesians to travel anywhere in the archipelago and communicate as fellow citizens.

“Tanzania is often castigated for the failure of its socialist experiment, but it is seldom given credit for its success in national integration on the mainland. Kiswahili is part and parcel of that integrative triumph”

Maruzi & Maruzi, *The Power of Babel: language and governance in the African experience*. (1998)

Tanzania. It's not just Indonesia that achieved congruence with identity bilingualism. Tanzania did the same with KiSwahili. The prefix “Ki” is the functional equivalent of “bahasa.” Like Riau Malay, KiSwahili was a trading language and the first language of only about 10% of Tanzania's population.

In 1962, KiSwahili was adopted as the national language, but other languages were not displaced. The government had neither a desire nor the resources to achieve territorial monolingualism. In 1967, KiSwahili became the sole official language of government. In 1968, it became the language of instruction in primary schools. In 1984, KiSwahili was designated as the language of both the social and political spheres and for adult education. English was pragmatically retained for secondary education and university study. In February of 2015, the Tanzania Ministry of Education and Vocational Training announced that KiSwahili would replace English at all levels.

KiSwahili is particularly important in cities, where the speakers of regional languages come together socially and economically with KiSwahili. Tanzania's policy of language rationalization, without territorial monolingualism, is a second example of successful identity bilingualism.

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<sup>17</sup> Similarly for the EU, Brexit presents an opportunity to use the international trade language - English - which is soon to be the native language of only a very small part of the EU community. The same cannot be said for French, which is also a major international language, or German, which has the largest native speaker population in Europe.

## 2.3 Identity Bilingualism and EU Legitimacy

2.3.1 Affective Legitimacy: Making Europeans. As the German philosopher Johann Fichte wrote: “Those who speak the same language ... have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly .... and are by nature an inseparable whole.” Today, Europeans mostly talk *about* each other. With identity bilingualism, they will be able to talk *to* each other just as easily. They will be able to travel across the continent and interact as fellow citizens in a common language. This is what Europeans told the Commission they wanted, when they responded to its Special Eurobarometer 386.

Even before a European community of communication is fully realized, teaching and learning a designated identity language will be a superordinate goal that increases affective legitimacy in the EU. The Robbers Cave Study explains how this will occur.

The Robbers Cave Study. In a seminal study on group formation and dynamics, twenty-two boys were recruited to spend three weeks at a summer camp. Behind the facade of a summer’s idle, a controlled experiment in social anthropology was conducted by the University of Oklahoma.

The boys were divided into two groups. The groups arrived separately, were kept apart and were unaware of each other. In the first week, each group engaged in activities that were designed to create a group identity and foster group cohesion. They lived in a group dormitory, chose group names (Eagles and Rattlers) and designed shirts that displayed their name.

In the second week, the groups were introduced and they participated in various competitions. As expected, competition increased each group’s cohesion and created antipathy towards the “others.” By the end of the second week, the boys sometimes engaged in behaviors that required the staff to intervene. It was easy to create hostility.

In the third week, the groups were combined and situations were contrived so that the boys had to work together or compromise, in order to achieve a desired outcome. By the end of this final week, the original groups had lost almost all of their salience and a general camaraderie had emerged. Working together to achieve “superordinate goals” replaced suspicion and hostility with solidarity and community.

2.3.2 Outcome Legitimacy and the Euro Crisis. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established in 1951 as a peace project, not an economic project. As expressed in the Schuman Declaration on May 9, 1950, the logic was that joint industrial production “will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”

The next step was the Plevin Plan, an attempt to establish a European Defense Community. It was seen as the alternative to the inclusion of West Germany within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But the real threat was not a divided Germany, it was the combined forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. A recovering Europe needed NATO to deal with that threat. West Germany joined NATO in May of 1955. The Plevin Plan was dropped and the ECSC lost its security rationale.



At a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Messina, Italy in June of 1955, the six nations of the ECSC re-conceptualized European integration as an economic project - beginning with a customs union. This led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC).

Outcome legitimacy, measured by economic growth, would provide the legitimacy for European integration. The first several decades after the formation of the EEC saw dramatically increased prosperity. Whether the prosperity was properly attributable to the EEC or was based on other post-war factors, the EEC enjoyed what became known as the “permissive consensus.” The permissive consensus reached its zenith with the 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), which created the European Union (EU) and led to the European currency (Euro).

Even if the outcome legitimacy of European prosperity was sufficient to legitimize the EEC, the Maastricht Treaty implicitly required substantial political integration. The creation of the Euro was not just an economic commitment, it was also a political commitment. A common currency meant a common macroeconomic policy and required fiscal convergence. The change from a project for economic integration to a project that required substantial political integration was largely ignored at the time.

The permissive consensus didn't last. In hindsight, it clearly couldn't. In a rather tentative way, some farsighted leaders recognized the need for an explicit political union and drafted a basic European constitution. In the summer of 2005, French and Dutch voters rejected the proposed European constitution, in large measure because the consequences of the political dimension of the EU on the nation-states was becoming clearer. Three years later, the political implications of a common currency became crystal clear, as a result of the Euro Crisis.

Many excellent books have dissected the Euro Crisis. In a nutshell, the Euro ran afoul of the “impossible trinity” or “trilemma,” which was described by Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Mundell in the early 1960s. The trilemma holds that it is impossible for a country to simultaneously have a fixed foreign exchange rate, free capital movement and an independent monetary policy. The Euro zone member states had given up their independent monetary policies. Greece, in particular, was caught in the trilemma. With the Euro Crisis, the outcome legitimacy of the permissive consensus period was stood on its head - it became the high cost of leaving, not the economic benefits of membership, that held the Euro Zone together.

How will identity bilingualism improve the EU's outcome legitimacy? In two ways. First, by improving the economic performance of the EU. The economic benefits of integration are significantly tied to language rationalization.

In February of 2009, the European Economic Review published a study by Jan and Janko Fidrmuc which looked at the economic impact of *lingua franca* English proficiency on trade in the European Union.<sup>18</sup> After analyzing trade among the EU countries, they reached the following conclusions:

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<sup>18</sup> On a global basis, Panjak Ghemawat, Professor of Global Strategy at the IESE business school (Spain) calculated that a common language increased trade 42%.

- (1) The gains from a common language are equal to the gains from a common currency.
- (2) The prevalence a *lingua franca* in the EU (English) increased trade by 30% and is the main driver of international trade in Western Europe.
- (3) If EU countries increased their English proficiency by 10%, trade among them would increase 14%.
- (4) If the other EU countries could match the success of the Netherlands in learning English (over 50%), it would increase EU trade by 70%.
- (5) In the newer EU member states and the candidate countries the impact of English proficiency on the trading relationships is even greater. Trade is 74% higher than it would be without the current English capacity.
- (6) While individuals can benefit from learning any language, nations only benefit by increasing the number of speakers of a *lingua franca*.

“Not surprisingly, a majority (68%) of executives surveyed believe that their workforce will need to know English if the company is to succeed in its international expansion plans. Mandarin is considered the second most important foreign language, but just 8% say their workers will need to be fluent in it.”

*Competing Across Borders* (2012)  
A Report from the Economist Intelligence Unit

[Spanish 6%, Russian 3%, Cantonese 2%, Portuguese 2%, French 2%, German 1%]

Second, and more essentially, identity bilingualism will help because political integration still has not occurred to the extent required for the common currency to succeed. Congruence between a community of communication and the institutions of governance will be needed in order to democratically exercise whatever political power is transferred to the EU. That point will be discussed further in the section on process legitimacy.

2.3.3 Values Legitimacy and the Enforcement Issue. The EU values are embodied in the criteria for membership. They can be summarized as comprehensive respect human rights, the rule of law and strict adherence to high standards of democratic process. (The last of these is addressed in the section on process legitimacy.)

Values legitimacy has been a particular strength of the EU, but flows from its outcome (economic) legitimacy. The economic benefits of membership were the incentive that induced prospective members to improve their human rights records and the rule of law. There has been some post-admission backsliding.

Enforcement problems began when the right wing Freedom Party (FP) joined a coalition government in Austria. The mainstream political parties of the EU overreacted and, in February of 2000,

issued sanctions - despite the absence of any actual violations of human rights, the rule of law or democratic norms. The sanctions backfired, making the FPO more popular in Austria and increasing anti-EU sentiment. Recognizing their error, the sanctions were quickly withdrawn.

In 2015, relations between Brussels and Poland ruptured over the failure of the newly elected Law and Justice Party (PiS) to accept five constitutional court judges chosen by the prior government. In December of 2016, under the provisions of Art. 7, Poland was given a two month deadline to respond to a list of recommendations from Brussels. At the time of this writing, a satisfactory response was deemed unlikely.

After two warnings, a qualified majority of the Council can revoke Poland's voting privileges. If it reaches that point, Hungary will side with Poland. It has similar problems adhering to best practices. The other two members of the V4 group, Czekia and Slovakia are also likely to support Poland.

The conventional wisdom is that the EU will not take the final step due to political circumstances. These include the risk of encouraging populist movements before several important elections and the need to avoid alienating the Eastern edge of the EU while Russia is making trouble in Ukraine. A Belgian proposal to periodically review all member states is one possible way to defer making a decision.

Time will tell, but the formerly bright light of values legitimacy in the EU is looking a bit dimmer at the moment. By increasing citizen to citizen contact, identity bilingualism would increase grassroots support for European values, when and where a government backslides.

2.3.4 Process Legitimacy and the Democratic Deficit. Democratic legitimacy, the newest form of legitimacy, is a special type of values legitimacy. It separates the means and the end. By focusing on process, it permits collective action by more heterogeneous communities. The only constraint for collective action based on democratic legitimacy is that there must be a community of communication that is congruent with the institutions of governance. It is not enough to talk about others; in a democracy, citizens must be able to talk to each other. Democracy is Europe's gift of process legitimacy. It culminated in the creation of a broadly enfranchised citizenry and has become the ideal in global governance.

The phrase "democratic deficit" was first used in reference to the EEC in the 1970's, due to the transfer of power from nation-state legislatures to the intergovernmental Council. This led to the direct election of a European Parliament in 1979. However, the other EU institutions exhibit an ambivalent attitude towards Parliament that prevents it from functioning in the familiar manner of a nation-state legislature. A partially inter governmental and linguistically diverse organization, like the EU, will have a democratic deficit relative to its constituent member nation-states which have the benefit of congruence between a linguistically coherent demos and a less remote polity.

But, the EU does not even make the best case under the circumstances. For example, the European Parliament cannot initiate legislation. Parliament is problematic in other ways. Its legislative process is radically different from the legislative process in the member nation-states, so almost no Europeans

understand how it works. As a result, voter participation in elections to the European Parliament has declined in each of the seven elections held since 1979.

There is, however, a much bigger democratic deficit that is not attributable to intergovernmental institutions or a strange and confusing Parliament. The big problem is that there is no European demos. Consider the definition of democracy in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Europeans are not "a people."

Majority rule only makes sense if it is a majority of a community that recognizes itself as such (demos) and which is congruent with the institutions of governance (polity). Between elections, only a common language with an identity function will permit the continuous dialogue that is a prerequisite for meaningful democracy. When elections are held, being outvoted by "others" is experienced as tyranny, not democracy. A common language reduces the risk of feeling that you are governed by others - a feeling that is at the core of the EU's legitimacy crisis.

"A common language connects the members of a community into an information-sharing network with formidable collective powers."

Professor Stephen Pinker, *The Language Instinct* (1994)  
Department of Psychology, Harvard University

2.3.5 Ten Reasons to Adopt Identity Bilingualism. Multiple crises in the EU have produced a "fight or flight" response. Will Europeans flee to the comfortable familiarity of the monolingual nation-state model or fight to overcome the challenges and gain the advantages that come with regional collective action? It is too soon to know, but "fight or flight" is the fundamental question confronting the EU. Let's fight.

1. Identity bilingualism is what Europeans want. Over two-thirds (69%) of Europeans say that all Europeans should be able to speak a single language. When what the people want is also good for them, there is no reason not to act. Identity bilingualism preserves the existing linguistic ecosystem while giving Europeans the community of communication that they want and need.

2. Identity bilingualism can increase the EU's democratic legitimacy. As discussed above, relative to the nation-states the EU has a two part democratic deficit: (1) an institutional deficit (polity deficit) and a community deficit (demos deficit). Identity bilingualism directly addresses the second problem and, in the process, opens options to repair the first.

3. Identity bilingualism will Increase trade among member states. As discussed above, increasing the use of English will increase trade among the member states of the European Union.

4. Identity bilingualism will increase cross borders services. It is relatively easy to trade goods between language communities. It is far harder to cross linguistic borders in the services sector. Identity

bilingualism will remove the linguistic border. This will not apply just to European borders. Global trade in services will increase with the implementation of identity bilingualism in the global *lingua franca*.

5. Identity bilingualism will increase employment of European youth. The effects of the Euro Crisis fell disproportionately on younger citizens. While unemployment increased for everyone, the unemployment rate for younger citizens often doubled or nearly doubled the overall rate. Younger people acquire language skills more easily, so the economic benefits that flow from adopting a policy of identity bilingualism will reduce the risk of a “lost generation.”

6. Identity bilingualism will immediately increase solidarity. Learning a European identity language will be a superordinate goal that brings Europeans together. Affective legitimacy will begin to increase as soon as the superordinate goal is adopted. That is the lesson of the Robbers Cave Study.

7. Identity bilingualism will help reduce reliance on the USA. When President Donald Trump declared that NATO was “obsolete” it caused great concern in Europe, but no discernible action. Most members of NATO have consistently failed to meet their NATO obligations.<sup>19</sup> For well over a decade, several USA Secretaries of Defense have raised this issue to no effect. On February 15, 2017 the new U.S. Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis, added a new element to the old complaint - the possibility of a reduction of support for NATO. In a speech to NATO allies he said: “I owe it to you to give you clarity on the political reality .... If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to the alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense....”

The current deficit in meeting their commitment is \$100 billion. While President Trump has been very polarizing on most issues, his criticism of European support for NATO is popular on the right, where concern over European unwillingness to pay a “fair share” is strong, and on the left, where the USA defense spending (3.6% of GDP) is seen as excessive. This could easily end badly for NATO.

What is referred to as the creation of an EU pillar in NATO is one of the few ideas that is receiving serious attention. For this to happen, the EU members of NATO will need to make much more efficient and effective use of their military budgets. It will require greater integration of military forces. Merely increasing the amount that is spent less efficiently is not prudent.

What would an EU pillar within NATO or any other form of European coordination look like? To be effective, the pillar would look a lot like the bilingual armed forces of Belgium. Despite the political differences between the Flemish and Walloons, the Belgian military has done a good job of integrating. Something very similar would be possible for the European pillar, after the EU adopted a policy identity bilingualism.

In Belgium, at induction the language preference of the soldier is presumed to match that of their community of origin, unless otherwise specified. Basic training is in that language and soldiers serve in monolingual units. Orders and commands are in the soldier’s language. Non-commissioned and

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<sup>19</sup> Great Britain, Poland, Estonia and Greece have met the 2% of GDP commitment. Germany spends 1.2%. Others spend as little as 1%.

commissioned officers are required to be fluent in either French or Dutch and to have a working knowledge of the other language. Fluency in both French and Dutch is required for Majors and above.

The percentage of officers who are native speakers now matches the community, with 40% native French speakers and 60% native Dutch speakers. Bilingualism has been accomplished without degrading essential readiness. If Walloon Officers can learn Dutch and Flemish Officers can learn French, Officers in the European pillar can learn English. A linguistically coherent European officers corps will deliver better value for the expense.

8. Identity bilingualism, modeled on a successful EU, will make global problems more tractable. The world needs larger communities, not just bridges. To the extent that the world's nearly 200 nation-states can consolidate into a smaller number of regional powers, such as one European Union instead of 28 European nation-states, global problems will be more tractable. Citizens of the smaller countries, which are now often ignored, will have a voice in world affairs. Perhaps I am too optimistic, but the fact that so many states are attempting to increase their regional coherence suggests that I am not alone in this hope. The EU is the designer of regional governance, just as the Europe designed and perfected the nation-state model.

9. Identity bilingualism will help save smaller languages and increasing access to diversity. Identity bilingualism may be adopted to improve governance, but it will do more. The 16th Edition of Ethnologue lists 234 languages in Europe. With identity bilingualism, smaller language communities will gain access to global discourse and, reciprocally, everyone will have better access to their ideas. The increase in access will not require language shift, as bilingualism will shelter the smaller language communities from the pressures that cause it.

In a 1964 essay, "The African Writer and the English Language," Chinua Achebe explained his decision to write in English: it was flexible enough for him to express his African experience and it gave him a much larger audience than any African language. He recalled reading Jorge Amado's *Gabriella*, in an English translation. It gave him a glimpse "of the exciting Afro-Latin culture which is the pride of Brazil and is quite unlike any other culture." He noted that there were hundreds of other Brazilian writers, but "the vast majority will be closed to the rest of the world forever, including no doubt the work of some excellent writers." The same can be said for most language communities. *Anyone who has read Mr. Achebe in English is grateful for his bilingualism.* Identity bilingualism, using a broader language, can increase the audience for writers from all language communities and will benefit both the writers and their new audience.

10. Identity bilingualism will make Europe even more of a global leader. The larger nation-states, either in population or in geographic reach and resources, have an advantage over the smaller ones. To counteract this advantage, regional governance is the obvious solution. The African Union, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and other regional organizations are letting the EU blaze the trail for them. Being the first actor will, at least potentially, provide numerous opportunities for the EU to develop cooperative relationships with other regions in achieving the common goal of balancing the power of the biggest nation-states: the USA, China, Russia and India.

“As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to all men of all nations and races.”

Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871)

### Part 3

#### Implementation: What Will European Identity Bilingualism Look Like

When considering the implementation of identity bilingualism, I think about Luxembourg and the role of its school system. Bilingualism will be dramatically easier than trilingualism, but the Luxembourg model is helpful. First, though, it is important to consider the minimum requirements for the adoption of identity bilingualism.

##### 3.1 The Necessary Minimum: Not Hard, Not Expensive

The EU has an aspirational goal of trilingualism for its citizens. The only *essential* change required for the adoption of a policy of identity bilingualism is to specify that one of the three languages *should* (not must) be English. This simple act would be both immediately and highly significant. It would be a superordinate goal for Europhiles. Many of the 69% of Europeans who support identity bilingualism would respond by taking practical steps to improve their English proficiency.

Two other steps *should* also be considered as part of the initial commitment. These directly involve institutions of the EU: (1) the designation of English as “the primary pivot language” and (2) the designation of the English pivot language version of documents as the primary reference for determining legislative intent.

English as the Primary Pivot Language. Giving English primary pivot language status would mean that translations would generally be translated into English first and then translated into all 23 (Post Brexit) official EU languages. This is already happening to a great extent, as it is very efficient. This would change actual practice very little, so it would not be difficult or expensive.

Using the Primary Pivot Language as the Text for Establishing Legislative Intent. Designating the English pivot language version as the primary source for legislative intent would reduce the ambiguities that are currently the basis for many disputes, making it much easier for courts to perform their role. Translations can rarely be made “word for word” even in closely related languages. Twenty-four original versions of each document makes it very hard to establish legislative intent. Everyone would benefit from the reduction of disagreements and litigation based on semantic arguments.

Beyond these three inexpensive (but important) steps, the implementation of a policy of identity bilingualism would be a function of overall budget priorities. As funds became available to support the policy, identity bilingualism would accelerate the existing trend towards greater English proficiency.

### 3.2 Funding Teacher Education and English Study

As EU budgets are prepared, programs that supported the policy of identity bilingualism can easily be identified, but will still compete with other programs for the available funds. There will be an increased need for English teachers. By allocating teacher training funds and teacher placement funds, it will be possible to balance the benefits between teacher source countries and teacher recipient countries. This will help to reduce unemployment among younger Europeans, who choose to train as English teachers, and bring all of the EU countries up to a common level of English language proficiency. The cultural exchange that will occur in this process will increase integration and European solidarity.

Perhaps additional funding will start with a kindergarten class and expand as this cohort moves up the grade levels. When the first class graduates from high school, around 2030, Europe will have its first class of identity bilinguals. The bilingual cohort will grow with each class that follows. When graduates became parents, their children will be raised as native European identity bilinguals.

### 3.3 Every Possible Outcome is Positive

An increase in the use of English will occur with or without a policy of identity bilingualism, based on the four structural advantages enjoyed by English: network externalities, path dependence, probability sensitive learning and the desire for maximin communication. Adopting a policy of identity bilingualism will accelerate the process, while sheltering all 254 of Europe's languages and increasing uniformity in the level of acquisition.

Waiting for the more gradual process to unfold will only delay and possibly frustrate the creation of a European community of communication. The legitimacy that only congruence can confer is a benefit that should be achieved as soon as possible. As noted previously, there will be an immediate positive impact from the designation of identity bilingualism as a superordinate goal.

Irrespective of whether the future of the EU is more supra national or more intergovernmental, identity bilingualism will create a European identity that supplements the individual's nation-state identity. Identity bilingualism will not dictate the future, but it will expand the possibilities. An increase in legitimacy will be welcome by all Europeans except those who wish for a complete failure of the EU. Certainly the 69% support shown in Eurobarometer 386 makes it clear that most of the people of Europe are ready.

I'm sure that this essay can be improved. Please share your suggestions with me.

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